MBA Teaching

Game Theory for Strategic Advantage (MIT Sloan MBA course 15.025) | Spring 2018, 2019 and 2020

A game-theory elective open to undergraduates, MBAs and PhDs. This course is neither a traditional MBA course nor a usual game theory one for undergraduates: it covers more and deeper formal theory than MBA courses usually do; and unlike undergraduate courses, every topic is complemented with in-depth, real-world applications that allow the student to evaluate the theory and learn how managers can better leverage the game theory toolkit. This mixed ‘theory-practice’ approach has proven successful in that the course became the most popular Sloan elective among MIT undergraduates in the of Spring 2020, and portions of it constitute the base for the Executive MBA version 15.S21 intended for senior management.

Syllabus

Featured as one of the best seven MIT classes for Harvard cross-registration.

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Game Theory for Strategic Advantage (MIT Sloan Executive MBA course 15.S21) | January 2019 and 2020

A two-day game-theory elective open to more senior MBA students (Executive MBAs, Sloan Fellows, and Alumni). To better exploit the rich and diverse experience of the student body, this course moves according to lecture-based style using in-class games and mini-projects, and open discussions, which allows everyone to understand the scope of applicability of the subject in business. The topics vary year by year, but special emphasis is put in (i) exploring the limits of rationality, (ii) assessing the informational content of actions, (iii) sustaining cooperation in repeated interactions, and (iv) steering behavior via credible threats.

Economic Analysis for Business Decisions (MIT Sloan MBA course 15.010) | Fall 2013, 2014 and 2016

A Sloan’s core subject in microeconomics, examining how businesses create and capture value, as well as how they compete and cooperate with one another. The course starts with competitive markets, then considers how firms price when they have market power, and finally it uses game theory to consider strategic interactions between and within firms.

Syllabus

Other Graduate Teaching

University of Chile

Continuous-time Methods for Economics and Finance  (Dec. 2011 and 2014).  A 1-week graduate course offered in the School of Engineering:

  1. Class 1: Probability Basics
  2. Class 2: Stochastic Integration
  3. Class 3: Connections with Differential Equations
  4. Class 4: Dynamic Programming
  5. Class 5: The Principal-Agent Problem
  6. Class 6: The Principal-Agent Problem in Continuous Time

M.I.T.

Guest lectures in the Organizational Economics Ph.D. course:

  • Dynamic Principal-Agent Problem
  • Dynamic Incentives with Brownian Information

Undergraduate Teaching

Princeton University (Towbes Prize for Undergraduate Teaching 2011 and 2013): Teaching assistant for

  • Introduction to Microeconomics (Fall 2010, 2011 and Spring 2013)
  • The Great Recession: Causes, Consequences and Remedies (Spring 2011)

Universidad de Chile: Lecturer for Macroeconomics (Spring 2008)

Universidad de Los Andes: Lecturer for Microeconomics (Spring 2008) and Algebra (Fall 2007)