Working Papers
Activist Trading Dynamics
Doruk Cetemen, Gonzalo Cisternas, Aaron Kolb and S. Viswanathan01/2023 version
- A leader activist can trade strategically to steer other blockholders to add value to a firm
- The model’s predictions match several aspects of wolf pack activism
Signaling with Private Monitoring
Gonzalo Cisternas and Aaron KolbRevise and resubmit at The Review of Economic Studies
PDF Supplementary Appendix Code: spm.nb
- A dynamic signaling game in which the receiver’s observations are private leads to a complex problem of higher-order beliefs
- Situations like this abound – we introduce a framework for analyzing them
Misinformation in Social Media: The Role of Verification Incentives
Gonzalo Cisternas and Jorge Vasquez02/2023 version
- An equilibrium theory of fake news amenable to policy analysis
- Algorithms that detect and remove fake content from platforms may not work as intended
A Note on the Comparative Statics of Optimal Procurement Auctions
Gonzalo Cisternas and Nicolás Figueroa- A supplier with private information about her costs becomes more efficient
- Will this lead to more profits when an optimal mechanism is in place?
Publications
Consumer Scores and Price Discrimination
Alessandro Bonatti, Gonzalo CisternasThe Review of Economic Studies, 87(2), 750–791, 2020
PDF Slides Journal Article Supplementary Appendix Code: scores.nb Media: Represent Consumers Letter to FTC
- A score based on signals of past purchases is used to price discriminate
- Strategic consumers can benefit from data collection, but score transparency is key
Career Concerns and the Nature of Skills
Gonzalo CisternasAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 10(2), 152-89, 2018
PDF Journal Article Media: AEA Research Highlights
- Workers exert effort to attempt to boost their reputations for being skilled
- Whether skills are endogenous or not matters
Two-Sided Learning and the Ratchet Principle
Gonzalo CisternasThe Review of Economic Studies, 85(1), 307–351, 2018
PDF Slides Journal Article
- Attempting to manipulate others’ beliefs can come at the cost of higher expectations of future performance
- An unexpected way to find equilibria based on a novel ODE is uncovered
Dynamic Oligopoly with Incomplete Information
Alessandro Bonatti, Gonzalo Cisternas, Juuso ToikkaThe Review of Economic Studies, 84(2), 503–546, 2017
PDF Slides Journal Article
- A market in which prices are noisy and firms have private information about their costs opens up
- A race for leadership with firms trying to manipulate rivals’ beliefs emerges
Sequential Procurement Auctions and Their Effect on Investment Decisions
Gonzalo Cisternas, Nicolas FigueroaRAND Journal of Economics, 46, 824-843, 2015
PDF Slides Journal Article
- Can a buyer promote competition and cost-reducing investments among suppliers?
- Optimal advantages to past winners can achieve both goals
